The impact of ACWs on Hizballah's and Hamas' strategy between 2000 and 2014

Abstract

This thesis examines the impact of Advanced Conventional Weapons (ACWs) on Hizballah’s and Hamas’ strategy between 2000 and 2014. The introduction of ACWs by the weaker side into the dialectic of the Arab/Israeli conflict during the 2^nd Lebanon War, also known as the July War, in 2006, questions our understanding of the concept of asymmetry based on the principle of imbalance of power (Stepanova; 2008: 17-18).

To understand the nature of this impact, two key points have to be underlined. First, ACWs constitute an element of an overall strategic narrative. This strategic narrative conceived as “the foundation of all strategy, upon which all else, policy, rhetoric and action is built” (Vlahos, in Betz; 2008: 514) is called Muqawama (‘resistance’). It postulates that Israel is an artificial state which might collapse as the result of a persistent attrition (Kober; 2009: 36) that targets Israel’s weaknesses. Second, as demonstrated by Hoskins and O’Loughlin with the concept of ‘diffused war’ (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010: 13) or Bolt with the concept of ‘Propagation of the deed’ (Bolt; 2012:2-3) the tactical use of advanced weaponry is not only conceived by non-state organisations as a tactical element meant to influence exclusively the course of the battle, but also as a media weapon able to influence key audiences’ perceptions of the conflict in order to produce a more coherent and powerful message. Thus, maximising the political effect of a strategic narrative based on ACWs, the two organisations literally illustrate Freedman’s definition of strategy: “strategy is the art of creating power” (Freedman, in Heuser; 2010: 27).

In this perspective, this research has demonstrated that the use of ACWs, as a part of the two organisations’ strategic narrative, generated strategic successes (Gray; 2002: 34), that mainly undermined Israel’s deterrent power and Israel’s political posture for the benefit of the two organisations’ political posture, not only within the immediate confrontational arena, but also within the Arab World and within international opinion. That said, as explained by Clausewitz’s idea of strategy, war is submitted to the principles of non-linearity and unpredictability due to the fact that the outcomes of one side’s strategy is the result of the interaction of both sides’ strategy (Clausewitz 1989: 139). Therefore the impact of ACWs worked as a double-edged sword that produced undesired outcomes and forced the two organisations to adjust their policies.

Date of Award	21 Jun 2016
Original language	English
Awarding Institution	University of St Andrews
Supervisor	Anthony F Lang Jr (Supervisor)