Exploring the dispositional account of self-knowledge

Abstract

In this thesis, I start with the debate between the belief-first and language-first views on self-knowledge and assess their strength and problems, before proposing the desiderata for a more satisfactory account for self-knowledge. I present what I call the dispositional account of self-knowledge as an alternative to expressivism that avoids some of its major problems, especially how it cannot account for cases where one does not express her mental states. I then show how self-knowledge is possible through the awareness of the disposition in cases where there is no public expression. In particular, the awareness of the dispositions to express is treated as a specific case of how we can be aware of our voluntary behaviours as active agents. In addition, I argue how the dispositional account could account for a wide range of mental phenomena. I then consider how we form beliefs based on the awareness of the dispositions, and how the beliefs can be justified. Lastly, I come back to the desiderata for a more satisfactory account of self-knowledge we started with, and examine if the dispositional account could satisfactorily meet our desiderata.

Date of Award	3 Dec 2025
Original language	English
Awarding Institution	University of St Andrews
Supervisor	Crispin Wright (Supervisor)