Classifying constructivism

: carving out metanormative real estate

Abstract

I argue that constructivism about normative properties and reasons offers a metanormative position distinct from realism and antirealist expressivism. I defend my position by arguing that constructivism can offer a normative psychology distinct from realist and expressivist accounts, that positions of this kind can explain why we have non-arbitrary reasons for certain normative standards, and that an account of constructed normative properties can resist realist and expressivist interpretations. This defense spans across four chapters. Chapter One offers a new account of valuing attitudes as the conceptual foundation for my constructivist position. Chapter Two shows that, as a consequence of my position, our practical deliberations commit us to the categorical imperative. Building on the prior chapters, Chapter Three then proposes a constructivist foundation for normative properties that distinguishes the view from canonical forms of realism and expressivism. Finally, Chapter Four offers my defense against shmagency-style arguments that would challenge a metanormative constructivism that utilizes constitutivist arguments. Together, I offer these four chapters as an initial sketch, and collective defense, of metanormative constructivism.

Date of Award	3 Dec 2025
Original language	English
Awarding Institution	University of St Andrews
Supervisor	Justin Snedegar (Supervisor) & Jens Timmermann (Supervisor)