A defence of the truth norm of belief

Abstract

For belief, the standard of correctness is truth. Truth is said to be the norm of belief. This thesis aims to address some recent challenges relating to various aspects of the truth norm of belief on a reason-based normative framework. On a reason-based normative framework, normativity is a matter of (normative) reasons. Reasons are facts that count in favour of a response, grounded in value-based, desire-based, constitutive, or practice-based facts. Reasons are the sort of things that we can respond to and they have weights in making a claim on us when we stand in a relation to them. Three anti-normativist challenges arise in recent discussion. First, the grounding challenge concerns whether the reason to believe truly (correctly) and to refrain from believing falsely (incorrectly) can be properly grounded. Second, the guidance challenge concerns whether the reason to believe truly and to refrain from believing falsely is something we can respond to in our belief-formation. Third, the weighting challenge concerns whether the reason to believe truly and to refrain from believing falsely has any weight in making a claim on us regarding what we ought to/may believe. In this thesis, I offer novel responses to all three challenges. I develop and defend a practice-based, variantist account of the truth norm, according to which, the truth norm of belief is grounded in a justified social practice, guides our belief-formation on a reason- responsive model of epistemic guidance, and makes varying claims on us regarding what we
ought to/may believe depending on the circumstances.

Date of Award	13 Jun 2022
Original language	English
Awarding Institution	University of St Andrews
Supervisor	Philip Alexander Ebert (Supervisor) & Crispin James Garth Wright (Supervisor)