Abstract
Despite recent challenges, it is commonly held that certain indexical terms such as ‘I', ‘here’ and ‘now’ have a necessary or ‘essential’ role in certain kinds of action. I argue that this is correct, and I offer an explanation. A use of an indexical term of the kind in question connotes a specific relation between the thinking subject and the reference of the indexical. The mental representation of this relation has an epistemic feature that I call first-person redundancy. I show through a regress argument that a mental state of this kind is essential for common kinds of action, and perhaps for all actions.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 211-233 |
Journal | Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society |
Volume | 115 |
Issue number | 3 pt 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Dec 2015 |