Abstract
This paper argues against a popular view of forgiveness by holding that there are some cases—certain tragic dilemma cases—in which a person may be wronged by an action that is not itself wrong. Blaming a person is apt only when the person has done something that is all things considered wrong. Thus, in these tragic dilemma cases, it is not apt to blame the person who wronged by performing an all things considered right action. Yet it also seems that the person who has been wronged is in a position to forgive the wrong. But one view of forgiveness holds that forgiveness renders blame inapt. Yet, in the sorts of cases discussed, there is a point to forgiveness even when blame is already inapt.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Oxford studies in agency and responsibility Volume 4 |
| Editors | David Shoemaker |
| Place of Publication | Oxford |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Chapter | 10 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191843563 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780198805601, 9780198805618 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 3 Aug 2017 |
Keywords
- Blame
- Wrongdoing
- Forgiveness
- T. M. Scanlon
- Susan Wolf
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Julia Lynn Driver
- School of Philosophical, Anthropological and Film Studies - Professorial Fellow in Philosophy
- Philosophy - Professorial Fellow in Philosophy
Person: Academic