Why the handicapped child case is hard

This paper discusses the handicapped child case and some other variants of Derek Parfit's non-identity problem (Parfit, 1984). The case is widely held to show that there is harmless wrongdoing, and that a moral system which tries to reduce wrongdoing directly to harm ('person-affecting morality') is inadequate. I show that the argument for this does not depend (as some have implied it does) on Kripkean necessity of origin. I distinguish the case from variants ('wrongful life cases') of the non-identity problem which do not hear directly on person-affecting morality as I understand it. And finally, I describe a respect in which the handicapped child case is puzzling and counter-intuitive, even on the supposition that it is a case of harmless wrongdoing. I conclude that the case is 'hard': it will take more than the rejection of person-affecting morality to remove its puzzling character.