Why Does Time Seem to Pass?

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41 Citations (Scopus)


According to the B-theory, the passage of time is an illusion. The B-theory therefore requires an explanation of this illusion before it can be regarded as fully satisfactory; yet very few B-theorists have taken up the challenge of trying to provide one. In this paper I take some first steps toward such an explanation by first making a methodological proposal, then a hypothesis about a key element in the phenomenology of temporal passage. The methodological proposal focuses on the representational content of the element of experience by virtue of which time seems to pass. The hypothesis involves the claim that the experience of change involves the representation of something enduring, rather than perduring, through any change.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)92-116
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Issue number1
Early online date11 Jan 2011
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2012


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