Who's afraid of determinism?

Leslie Stevenson*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)
9 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Because of the idealizations involved in the ideas of a total state of the world and of all the laws of nature, the thesis of all-encompassing determinism is unverifiable. Our everyday non-scientific talk of causation does not imply determinism; nor is it needed for the Kantian argument for a general causal framework as a condition for experience of an objective world. Determinism is at best a regulative ideal for science, something to be approached but never reached.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)431-450
Number of pages20
JournalPhilosophy
Volume89
Issue number3
Early online date10 Jan 2014
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2014

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