What's the matter with super-Humeanism?

William Simpson

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Abstract

Esfeld has proposed a minimalist ontology of nature called ‘super-Humeanism’ that purports to accommodate quantum phenomena and avoid standard objections to neo-Humean metaphysics. I argue that Esfeld’s sparse ontology has counterintuitive consequences and generates two self-undermining dilemmas concerning the nature of time and space. Contrary to Esfeld, I deny that super-Humeanism supports an ontology of microscopic particles that follow continuous trajectories through space.
Original languageEnglish
Article numberaxz028
JournalBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science
VolumeIn press
Early online date1 Jul 2019
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 1 Jul 2019

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