Abstract
Developments in truthmaker semantics for the most part stay clear of the metaphysical issue of what sort of entities serve as the truthmakers and falsitymakers for sentences. It is assumed that perhaps facts or states of affairs (Fine 2017a; Jago 2020), with these taken sometimes as concrete particulars (Hawke 2018) could serve for the job, but nonetheless that some such entities would do. In this paper I take a closer look at the issue of what entities could or could not play the role of truthmakers and falsitymakers in standard truthmaker semantics (Fine 2016, 2017a, b; Fine and Jago 2019), based on desiderata imposed by metaphysical and semantic considerations.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | Topoi |
Early online date | 15 Oct 2024 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 15 Oct 2024 |
Keywords
- States
- Thruthmaker semantics
- Impossible worlds
- Rigid embodiments
- Modal realism