What the states of truthmaker semantics could (not) be

Francisca Silva*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Developments in truthmaker semantics for the most part stay clear of the metaphysical issue of what sort of entities serve as the truthmakers and falsitymakers for sentences. It is assumed that perhaps facts or states of affairs (Fine 2017a; Jago 2020), with these taken sometimes as concrete particulars (Hawke 2018) could serve for the job, but nonetheless that some such entities would do. In this paper I take a closer look at the issue of what entities could or could not play the role of truthmakers and falsitymakers in standard truthmaker semantics (Fine 2016, 2017a, b; Fine and Jago 2019), based on desiderata imposed by metaphysical and semantic considerations.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages14
JournalTopoi
Early online date15 Oct 2024
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 15 Oct 2024

Keywords

  • States
  • Thruthmaker semantics
  • Impossible worlds
  • Rigid embodiments
  • Modal realism

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