Abstract
The thesis of this paper is that, if it is construed individualistically, epistemic justification does not capture the conditions that philosophers of science would impose on justified belief in a scientific hypothesis. The difficulty arises from beliefs acquired through testimony. From this I derive a lesson that epistemologists generally, and epistemologists of testimony in particular, should learn from philosophers of science: we ought to repudiate epistemic individualism and move towards a more fully social epistemology.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 12541-12559 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | Synthese |
| Volume | 199 |
| Issue number | 5-6 |
| Early online date | 16 Aug 2021 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Dec 2021 |
Keywords
- Testimony
- Epistemology of testimony
- Reliance
- Philosophy of science
- Evidence
- Social epistemology
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