What epistemologists of testimony should learn from philosophers of science

Sanford C. Goldberg*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


The thesis of this paper is that, if it is construed individualistically, epistemic justification does not capture the conditions that philosophers of science would impose on justified belief in a scientific hypothesis. The difficulty arises from beliefs acquired through testimony. From this I derive a lesson that epistemologists generally, and epistemologists of testimony in particular, should learn from philosophers of science: we ought to repudiate epistemic individualism and move towards a more fully social epistemology.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)12541-12559
Number of pages19
Issue number5-6
Early online date16 Aug 2021
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2021


  • Testimony
  • Epistemology of testimony
  • Reliance
  • Philosophy of science
  • Evidence
  • Social epistemology


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