Ways Things Can’t Be

Greg Restall*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

49 Citations (Scopus)


Paraconsistent logics are often semantically motivated by considering “impossible worlds.” Lewis, in “Logic for equivocators,” has shown how we can understand paraconsistent logics by attributing equivocation of meanings to inconsistent believers. In this paper I show that we can understand para-consistent logics without attributing such equivocation. Impossible worlds are simply sets of possible worlds, and inconsistent believers (inconsistently) believe that things are like each of the worlds in the set. I show that this account gives a sound and complete semantics for Priest’s paraconsistent logic LP, which uses materials any modal logician has at hand.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)583-596
Number of pages14
JournalNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 1997


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