Abstract
For Spinoza, the highest thing we can hope for is acquiescentia in se ipso—acquiescence
in oneself. As an ethical ideal, this might appear as a complacent
quietism, a licence to accept the way you are and give up hope of
improving either yourself or the world. I argue that the opposite is the
case. Self-acquiescence in Spinoza’s sense is a very challenging goal:
it requires a form of self-understanding that is extremely difficult to
attain. It also involves occupying a daring and radical political
position, one that obstructs the psychological mechanisms by which
political power is typically maintained.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 145-163 |
Journal | Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society |
Volume | 120 |
Issue number | 2 |
Early online date | 28 May 2020 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jul 2020 |