Ultimatum bargaining behavior in Israel, Japan, Slovenia, and the United States: A social utility analysis

M Costa-Gomes*, KG Zauner

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    31 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We explain the main Features of the results of the four-country ultimatum bargaining experiments of Roth et al. (1991), Amer. Econom. Rev. 81, 1068-1095) by a social utility model. The specification of social utility of a player has two parts: a linear combination of the monetary payoffs of the proposer and the responder and payoff uncertainty. We find that, on average, responders have negative regard for proposers' earnings in all countries. Proposers have negative regard fur responders' monetary earnings in countries where responders have high negative regard for proposers' earnings (USA and Slovenia). In countries where responders have: low negative regard for proposers' earnings (Israel and Japan), proposers are expected payoff maximizers. Classification Numbers: A13, C19, C44, C72, C92, D63, D64. (C) 2001 Academic Press.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)238-269
    Number of pages32
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume34
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Feb 2001

    Keywords

    • FAIRNESS
    • FORM GAMES
    • GAME-THEORY
    • ANONYMITY

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