Two distinctions about world-relative truth

Christopher Masterman

doi:10.1093/analys/anae048

Two distinctions about world-relative truth

Christopher Masterman

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

The distinction between truth in and truth at a possible world plays a significant role in many debates in modal metaphysics. In this note, I argue that there are two radically different ways of making the distinction precise. Moreover, I argue that the differences matter, showing how they differently constrain the modal metaphysics of properties and propositions.

Original language	English
Article number	anae048
Journal	Analysis
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anae048
Publication status	Published - 28 Jul 2025

Keywords

Propositions
Possible worlds
Truth in a world
Truth at a world

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10.1093/analys/anae048Licence: CC BY

Masterman_2025_Analysis_World-relative-truth_CC
© The Author(s) 2025. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Final published version, 1.12 MBLicence: CC BY

Cite this

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Two distinctions about world-relative truth

Abstract

Keywords

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