Twin-Earth Externalism and Concept Possession

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4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Twin-Earth-style thought experiments show that the contents of a person's thoughts fail to supervene on her intrinsic properties. Several recent philosophers have made the further claim that Twin-Earth-style thought experiments produce metaphysically necessary conditions for the possession of certain concepts. I argue that the latter view is false, and produce counterexamples to several proposed conditions.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)457-472
Number of pages15
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Volume85
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2007

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