Truthmakers and the Disjunction Thesis

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52 Citations (Scopus)


The correspondence theory of truth has experienced something of a revival recently in the form of the Truthmaker Axiom: whatever is true, something makes it true. We consider various postulates which have been proposed to characterize truthmaking, in particular, the Disjunction Thesis (DT), that whatever makes a disjunction true must make one or other disjunct true. In conjunction with certain other assumptions, DT leads to triviality. We show that there are elaborations of truthmaking on which DT holds (which must therefore take steps to avoid the triviality); but that there are more plausible accounts of truthmaking on which DT fails.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)67-79
Number of pages13
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2000




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