Abstract
I present an account of truth values for classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and the modal logic S5, in which truth values are not a fundamental category from which the logic is defined, but rather, an idealisation of more fundamental logical features in the proof theory for each system. The result is not a new set of semantic structures, but a new understanding of how the existing semantic structures may be understood in terms of a more fundamental notion of logical consequence.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 241-264 |
Number of pages | 24 |
Journal | Studia Logica |
Volume | 92 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jul 2009 |
Keywords
- Completeness
- Intuitionistic logic
- Modal logic
- Proof
- Sequent calculus
- Truth value