Truth-Relativism, Norm-Relativism, and Assertion

Patrick Michael Greenough

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.003.0009

Truth-Relativism, Norm-Relativism, and Assertion

Patrick Michael Greenough

Philosophy

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The main goal in this paper is to outline and defend a form of Relativism, under which truth is absolute but assertibility is not. I dub such a view Norm-Relativism in contrast to the more familiar forms of Truth-Relativism. The key feature of this view is that just what norm of assertion, belief, and action is in play in some context is itself relative to a perspective. In slogan form: there is no fixed, single norm for assertion, belief, and action. Upshot: 'knows' is neither context-sensitive nor perspectival.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Assertion
Subtitle of host publication	New Philosophical Essays
Editors	Jessica Brown, Herman Cappelen
Place of Publication	Oxford
Publisher	Oxford University Press
Pages	197-231
ISBN (Print)	978-0-19-957300-4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.003.0009
Publication status	Published - Jan 2011

Keywords

ASSERTION
BELIEF
EPISTEMIC CONTEXTUALISM
RELATIVISM
NORMS FOR ASSERTION
NORMS FOR BELIEF
NORMS FOR ACTION
NORM-RELATIVISM
INVARIANTISM
KNOWLEDGE

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10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.003.0009

Cite this

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abstract = "The main goal in this paper is to outline and defend a form of Relativism, under which truth is absolute but assertibility is not. I dub such a view Norm-Relativism in contrast to the more familiar forms of Truth-Relativism. The key feature of this view is that just what norm of assertion, belief, and action is in play in some context is itself relative to a perspective. In slogan form: there is no fixed, single norm for assertion, belief, and action. Upshot: 'knows' is neither context-sensitive nor perspectival.",

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KW - BELIEF

KW - EPISTEMIC CONTEXTUALISM

KW - RELATIVISM

KW - NORMS FOR ASSERTION

KW - NORMS FOR BELIEF

KW - NORMS FOR ACTION

KW - NORM-RELATIVISM

KW - INVARIANTISM

KW - KNOWLEDGE

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BT - Assertion

A2 - Brown, Jessica

A2 - Cappelen, Herman

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CY - Oxford

ER -

Truth-Relativism, Norm-Relativism, and Assertion

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Keywords

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