Truth-Relativism, Norm-Relativism, and Assertion

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Abstract

The main goal in this paper is to outline and defend a form of Relativism, under which truth is absolute but assertibility is not. I dub such a view Norm-Relativism in contrast to the more familiar forms of Truth-Relativism. The key feature of this view is that just what norm of assertion, belief, and action is in play in some context is itself relative to a perspective. In slogan form: there is no fixed, single norm for assertion, belief, and action. Upshot: 'knows' is neither context-sensitive nor perspectival.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAssertion
Subtitle of host publicationNew Philosophical Essays
EditorsJessica Brown, Herman Cappelen
Place of PublicationOxford
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages197-231
ISBN (Print)978-0-19-957300-4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2011

Keywords

  • ASSERTION
  • BELIEF
  • EPISTEMIC CONTEXTUALISM
  • RELATIVISM
  • NORMS FOR ASSERTION
  • NORMS FOR BELIEF
  • NORMS FOR ACTION
  • NORM-RELATIVISM
  • INVARIANTISM
  • KNOWLEDGE

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