Abstract
Definitions of the truth-making relation that appeal to the notion of metaphysical necessity are notoriously prone to problems, because they seem to be incapable of discriminating sufficiently finely between the truth-makers of different propositions, thus threatening to undermine or trivialize the very notion of a truth-maker. In this chapter, another approach is developed that appeals instead to a primitive notion of essence and explicates the truth-making relation in terms of a relationship of essential dependence between a proposition and its truth-maker. An advantage of this approach is that it draws on a theory of essence that is, very arguably, needed in any case to provide a satisfactory general account of modal truth and modal knowledge. As such, it is arguably superior to an account of truth-making that appeals merely to the unanalysed notion of a true propositions being true in virtue of its truth-maker.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Truth and truth-making |
Editors | E.J. Lowe, A. Rami |
Place of Publication | Abingdon, Oxon |
Publisher | Taylor and Francis |
Chapter | 4 |
Pages | 87-97 |
Number of pages | 11 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781315711683 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781844651450 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Nov 2008 |