Truth in fiction, impossible worlds, and belief revision

Christopher Badura*, Francesco Berto

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as (make-believed) belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them.

Original languageEnglish
Number of pages16
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
VolumeLatest Articles
Early online date27 Feb 2018
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 27 Feb 2018

Keywords

  • Impossible worlds
  • Inconsistent fiction
  • Sylvan's box
  • Truth in fiction
  • Belief revision

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