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Abstract
What sorts of things are the intuitions generated via thought experiment? Timothy Williamson has responded to naturalistic skeptics by arguing that thought-experiment intuitions are judgments of ordinary counterfactuals. On this view, the intuition is naturalistically innocuous, but it has a contingent content and could be known at best a posteriori. We suggest an alternative to Williamson's account, according to which we apprehend thought-experiment intuitions through our grasp on truth in fiction. On our view, intuitions like the Gettier intuition are necessarily true and knowable a priori. Our view, like Williamson's, avoids naturalistic skepticism.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 221-246 |
Number of pages | 26 |
Journal | Philosophical Studies |
Volume | 142 |
Issue number | 2 |
Early online date | 7 Nov 2007 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jan 2009 |
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Dive into the research topics of 'Thought-experiment intuitions and truth in fiction'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Projects
- 1 Finished
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Intuitions and Philosophical Methodology: Intuitions and Philosophical Methodology
Brown, J. A. (PI), Cappelen, H. W. (CoI), Onofri, A. (Student), Porro, L. C. (Student), Cath, Y. W. (Researcher), Huvenes, T. T. (Researcher) & Ichikawa, J. (Researcher)
Arts and Humanities Research Council
3/09/08 → 31/08/12
Project: Standard