There Are No Phenomenal Concepts

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51 Citations (Scopus)


Orthodoxy among contemporary philosophers of mind has it that phenomenal concepts provide the key to understanding many disputes between physicalists and their opponents. I deny that there are phenomenal concepts. My arguments exploit the sort of considerations that are typically used to motivate externalism about mental content. Although physicalists often appeal to phenomenal concepts to defend their view against the knowledge argument, I argue that this is a mistake. The knowledge argument depends on phenomenal concepts; if there are no phenomenal concepts, then the knowledge argument fails.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)935-962
Number of pages28
Issue number472
Early online date7 Dec 2009
Publication statusPublished - 2009


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