Abstract
Orthodoxy among contemporary philosophers of mind has it that phenomenal concepts provide the key to understanding many disputes between physicalists and their opponents. I deny that there are phenomenal concepts. My arguments exploit the sort of considerations that are typically used to motivate externalism about mental content. Although physicalists often appeal to phenomenal concepts to defend their view against the knowledge argument, I argue that this is a mistake. The knowledge argument depends on phenomenal concepts; if there are no phenomenal concepts, then the knowledge argument fails.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 935-962 |
| Number of pages | 28 |
| Journal | Mind |
| Volume | 118 |
| Issue number | 472 |
| Early online date | 7 Dec 2009 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2009 |