THE WAR OF ATTRITION WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

C PONSATI*, J SAKOVICS

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    29 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We present a continuous-time model of the war of attrition with exponential discounting and with two-sided incomplete information. We provide a full characterization of the Bayesian Equilibria of this game, without restricting strategies to be differentiable.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)239-254
    Number of pages16
    JournalMathematical Social Sciences
    Volume29
    Issue number3
    Publication statusPublished - Jun 1995

    Keywords

    • WAR OF ATTRITION
    • CONCESSION GAMES
    • GAMES
    • EXIT

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