The value of surprise in science

Steven French; Alice Murphy

doi:10.1007/s10670-021-00410-z

The value of surprise in science

Steven French, Alice Murphy

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Scientific results are often presented as ‘surprising’ as if that is a good thing. Is it? And if so, why? What is the value of surprise in science? Discussions of surprise in science have been limited, but surprise has been used as a way of defending the epistemic privilege of experiments over simulations. The argument is that while experiments can ‘confound’, simulations can merely surprise (Morgan, 2005). Our aim in this paper is to show that the discussion of surprise can be usefully extended to thought experiments and theoretical derivations. We argue that in focusing on these features of scientific practice, we can see that the surprise-confoundment distinction does not fully capture surprise in science. We set out how thought experiments and theoretical derivations can bring about surprises that can be disruptive in a productive way, and we end by exploring how this links with their future fertility.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1447-1466
Journal	Erkenntnis
Volume	88
Early online date	30 Jul 2021
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00410-z
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2023

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French_2021_Erk_Value-surprise-science_CC
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Cite this

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AB - Scientific results are often presented as ‘surprising’ as if that is a good thing. Is it? And if so, why? What is the value of surprise in science? Discussions of surprise in science have been limited, but surprise has been used as a way of defending the epistemic privilege of experiments over simulations. The argument is that while experiments can ‘confound’, simulations can merely surprise (Morgan, 2005). Our aim in this paper is to show that the discussion of surprise can be usefully extended to thought experiments and theoretical derivations. We argue that in focusing on these features of scientific practice, we can see that the surprise-confoundment distinction does not fully capture surprise in science. We set out how thought experiments and theoretical derivations can bring about surprises that can be disruptive in a productive way, and we end by exploring how this links with their future fertility.

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The value of surprise in science

Abstract

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