The Two-Dimensional Content of Consciousness

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In this paper I put forward a representationalist theory of conscious experience based on Robert Stalnaker's version of two-dimensional modal semantics. According to this theory the phenomenal character of an experience correlates with a content equivalent to what Stalnaker calls the diagonal proposition. I show that the theory is closely related both to functionalist theories of consciousness and to higher-order representational theories. It is also more compatible with an anti-Cartesian view of the mind than standard representationalist theories.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)319-349
Number of pages31
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2007




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