TY - JOUR
T1 - The Two-Dimensional Content of Consciousness
AU - Prosser, Simon James
N1 - 16/01/09: Changed from "Internet publication" to "Journal Article".
PY - 2007/12
Y1 - 2007/12
N2 - In this paper I put forward a representationalist theory of conscious experience based on Robert Stalnaker's version of two-dimensional modal semantics. According to this theory the phenomenal character of an experience correlates with a content equivalent to what Stalnaker calls the diagonal proposition. I show that the theory is closely related both to functionalist theories of consciousness and to higher-order representational theories. It is also more compatible with an anti-Cartesian view of the mind than standard representationalist theories.
AB - In this paper I put forward a representationalist theory of conscious experience based on Robert Stalnaker's version of two-dimensional modal semantics. According to this theory the phenomenal character of an experience correlates with a content equivalent to what Stalnaker calls the diagonal proposition. I show that the theory is closely related both to functionalist theories of consciousness and to higher-order representational theories. It is also more compatible with an anti-Cartesian view of the mind than standard representationalist theories.
KW - SEMANTICS
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=36448930181&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.springerlink.com/content/102978/?Content+Status=Accepted&sort=p_OnlineDate&sortorder=desc&v=expanded&mode=allwords&k=prosser
U2 - 10.1007/s11098-005-4281-2
DO - 10.1007/s11098-005-4281-2
M3 - Article
SN - 0031-8116
VL - 136
SP - 319
EP - 349
JO - Philosophical Studies
JF - Philosophical Studies
IS - 3
ER -