The Truth-Schema and the Liar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter


Since Tarski published his study of the concept of truth in the 1930s, it has been orthodox practice to suppose that every instance of the T-schema is true. However, some instances of the schema are false. These include the paradoxical instances exemplified by the Liar sentence. It is shown that a better schema allows a uniform treatment of truth in which the semantic paradoxes turn out to be simply false.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationUnity, Truth and the Liar
Subtitle of host publicationThe Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox
EditorsShahid Rahman, Tero Tulenheimo, Emmanuel Genot
ISBN (Electronic)978-1-4020-8468-3
ISBN (Print)978-1-4020-8467-6
Publication statusPublished - 2008

Publication series

NameLogic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science


  • Truth
  • Liar paradox
  • Correspondence platitude
  • Tarski
  • Bradwardine


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