The Old Problem Problem

Conceptual Engineering promises to deliver a new (or unduly neglected) way of doing philosophy whereby progress is to be made by assessing and improving our representational devices (words, concepts, meanings). This methodology faces a famous objection. Namely, Strawson’s Objection: ‘To do [Conceptual Engineering] is not to solve the typical philosophical problem, but to change the subject’ (Strawson [1963]. “Carnap’s Views on Conceptual Systems versus Natural Languages in Analytic Philosophy.” In The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, 503–518. La Salle: Open Court). Despite being over sixty years old, this Objection has yet to receive a fully satisfactory treatment – or so it will be argued. In fact, there are really two worries at large here. There is Strawson’s original worry plus a strengthened, deeper problem: even if you are not changing the subject in doing Conceptual Engineering, you are still not solving the original problem. This deeper objection is The Old Problem Problem. The primary goal here is to offer a response to this Problem which, in turn, delivers a new solution to Strawson’s Objection. This then yields a response to a related worry (The New Problem Problem): Conceptual Engineers are just answering questions that weren’t being asked. The aim here is not to defend Conceptual Engineering as such but to gain a better (more pluralist) picture of what this new approach to philosophy does, and does not, involve.