Abstract
Assertion plays a crucial dual role in Frege's conception of logic, a formal and a transcendental one. A recurrent complaint is that Frege's inclusion of the judgement-stroke (the formal counterpart of assertion) in the Begriffsschrift is either in tension with his anti-psychologism or wholly superfluous. Assertion, the objection goes, is at best of merely psychological significance. In this paper, I defend Frege against the objection by giving reasons for recognising the central logical significance of assertion in both its formal and its transcendental role.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1-22 |
Number of pages | 23 |
Journal | Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy |
Volume | 5 |
Issue number | 8 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 15 Aug 2017 |