The learner's motivation and the structure of habituation in Aristotle

Margaret Hampson*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)
5 Downloads (Pure)


Moral virtue is, for Aristotle, a state to which an agent’s motivation is central. For anyone interested in Aristotle’s account of moral development this invites reflection on two questions: how is it that virtuous motivational dispositions are established? And what contribution do the moral learner’s existing motivational states make to the success of her habituation? I argue that views which demand that the learner act with virtuous motives if she is to acquire virtuous dispositions misconstrue the nature and structure of the habituation process, but also obscure Aristotle’s crucial insight that the very practice of virtuous actions affords a certain discovery and can be transformative of an agent’s motivational states. Drawing attention, in Aristotle’s account, to an asymmetry between the agential perspective and the observation of others, I consider what the agential perspective affords the learner, and offer a novel interpretation of the role a learner’s existing motives play in her habituation.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)415-447
Number of pages33
JournalArchiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 10 Sept 2022


Dive into the research topics of 'The learner's motivation and the structure of habituation in Aristotle'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this