The justification of memory beliefs: evidentialism, reliabilism, conservatism

In this paper, forthcoming in *Goldman and his Critics*, I revisit the debate between Goldman and his evidentialist opponents on the justification of memory beliefs. I distinguish two sorts of epistemic status at issue and not usually clearly separated in these debates: historical justification vs. justification to retain a belief. A full epistemology of memory beliefs ought to give a unified account of both, acknowledging their distinctness but explaining each within the same theoretical framework and articulating their relations. I raise doubts about the resources of reliabilism for doing this. I conclude by making a plea for a less ambitious account of justification to retain beliefs, a restricted form of epistemic conservatism. I argue that the conservative account I recommend represents a kind of neutral baseline, insofar as there are both reliabilist-friendly arguments as well as evidentialist-friendly arguments for it.