The justification of memory beliefs: evidentialism, reliabilism, conservatism

Matthew McGrath

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, forthcoming in *Goldman and his Critics*, I revisit the debate between Goldman and his evidentialist opponents on the justification of memory beliefs. I distinguish two sorts of epistemic status at issue and not usually clearly separated in these debates: historical justification vs. justification to retain a belief. A full epistemology of memory beliefs ought to give a unified account of both, acknowledging their distinctness but explaining each within the same theoretical framework and articulating their relations. I raise doubts about the resources of reliabilism for doing this. I conclude by making a plea for a less ambitious account of justification to retain beliefs, a restricted form of epistemic conservatism. I argue that the conservative account I recommend represents a kind of neutral baseline, insofar as there are both reliabilist-friendly arguments as well as evidentialist-friendly arguments for it.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationGoldman and his Critics
EditorsBrian P. McLaughlin, Hilary Kornblith
Place of PublicationMalden, MA
PublisherWiley-Blackwell
Pages69-87
Number of pages19
ISBN (Electronic)9781118609378
ISBN (Print)9780470673676
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2016

Keywords

  • Memory
  • Epistemology
  • Justificaton
  • Reliabilism
  • Epistemic conservatism
  • Evidentialism

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