The goodness of the virtues and the Sun-like good

Alex Long*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

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Abstract

Does the Longer Way, described but not taken in Plato's Republic, provide understanding that justice and other virtues are good? Sarah Broadie argues that it does not, on the grounds that Socrates and the brothers learn about justice's goodness without taking the Longer Way. I argue that Socrates’ arguments for justice's goodness are not so complete as to make it impossible for philosopher-rulers to gain from the Longer Way greater understanding of the same point. My main textual evidence is a passage of Book IX (589b–c), a summary that has been widely underappreciated.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1260-1268
Number of pages9
JournalBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy
Volume31
Issue number6
Early online date6 Feb 2023
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 30 Sept 2023

Keywords

  • Sarah Broadie
  • Plato
  • Republic
  • Goodness
  • Justice

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