The generality of particular thought

Imogen Dickie

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Argues against a strong version of Evans's generality constraint, and for a weak version.

This paper is about the claim that, necessarily, a subject who can think that a is F must also have the capacities to think that a is G, a is H, a is I, and so on (for some reasonable range of G, H, I), and that b is F, c is F, d is F, and so on (for some reasonable range of b, c, d). I set out, and raise objections to, two arguments for a strong version of this claim (Gareth Evans' generality constraint). I present a new argument for a weaker version of the claim, and sketch some directions of enquiry which this new argument opens up.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)508-531
JournalThe Philosophical Quarterly
Volume60
Issue number240
Early online date2 Jun 2010
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2010

Keywords

  • Generality constraint
  • Evans

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