The effect of disagreement on noncooperative bargaining

P  Manzini; M  Mariotti

doi:10.1006/jeth.2001.2959

The effect of disagreement on noncooperative bargaining

P Manzini, M Mariotti

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

A seemingly mild assumption of the standard alternating offers bargaining model under risk is that the breakdown event is not strictly worse than the worst agreement. When this assumption is relaxed the structure of the equilibrium set of agreements changes in an interesting way. We analyse the effect of disagreement on equilibrium, and relate our result to a class of outside option models. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	490-499
Number of pages	10
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	107
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2959
Publication status	Published - Dec 2002

Keywords

disagreement
bargaining
PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM
MODEL
NASH

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10.1006/jeth.2001.2959

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The effect of disagreement on noncooperative bargaining

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Keywords

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