The divine and human will of Christ

Oliver D. Crisp*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

In this article, I argue that the neo-monothelite view favored by several evangelical Christian philosophers like Garry DeWeese, J. P. Moreland, and William Lane Craig, though theologically sophisticated, is nevertheless problematic. I also argue that Jordan Wessling’s attempt to offer a qualified defense of the neo-monothelite position is not successful in attempting to show that there is theological wiggle-room for the doctrine in terms of its appeal to theological authority. Nevertheless, the neo-monothelites have shown that there are conceptual problems that defenders of the dyothelite alternative must address. And these are problems that are not easily rebutted. I have offered several reasons for thinking that dyothelitism is still worthy of serious theological consideration that depends upon a different model of the hypostatic union, one that is concretist rather than abstractist. On balance, it seems to me that there is sufficient conceptual reason for holding to the dyothelitism of classical Christology given concretism, and sufficient authority for it in the tradition for us to maintain the doctrine. For these reasons, it seems to me that dyothelitism is to be preferred to these modern monothelite alternatives.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationImpeccability and temptation
Subtitle of host publicationunderstanding Christ's divine and human will
EditorsJohannes Grössl, Klaus von Stosch
Place of PublicationAbingdon, Oxon
PublisherTaylor and Francis
Chapter10
Pages199-215
Number of pages17
ISBN (Electronic)9780367618933, 9781000376654
ISBN (Print)9780367615024, 9780367618940
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 13 Apr 2021

Publication series

NameRoutledge studies in analytic and systematic theology

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