THE DEADLINE EFFECT - A THEORETICAL NOTE

C PONSATI

THE DEADLINE EFFECT - A THEORETICAL NOTE

C PONSATI

Research output: Contribution to journal › Comment/debate › peer-review

Abstract

A two-person concession game with a deadline is presented. It is proved that along the Bayesian equilibrium players tend to reach an agreement at the deadline.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	281-285
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	48
Issue number	3-4
Publication status	Published - Jun 1995

Keywords

DEADLINE
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
WAR OF ATTRITION

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title = "THE DEADLINE EFFECT - A THEORETICAL NOTE",

abstract = "A two-person concession game with a deadline is presented. It is proved that along the Bayesian equilibrium players tend to reach an agreement at the deadline.",

keywords = "DEADLINE, INCOMPLETE INFORMATION, WAR OF ATTRITION",

author = "C PONSATI",

year = "1995",

month = jun,

language = "English",

volume = "48",

pages = "281--285",

journal = "Economics Letters",

issn = "0165-1765",

publisher = "Elsevier",

number = "3-4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - THE DEADLINE EFFECT - A THEORETICAL NOTE

AU - PONSATI, C

PY - 1995/6

Y1 - 1995/6

N2 - A two-person concession game with a deadline is presented. It is proved that along the Bayesian equilibrium players tend to reach an agreement at the deadline.

AB - A two-person concession game with a deadline is presented. It is proved that along the Bayesian equilibrium players tend to reach an agreement at the deadline.

KW - DEADLINE

KW - INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

KW - WAR OF ATTRITION

M3 - Comment/debate

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 48

SP - 281

EP - 285

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 3-4

ER -

THE DEADLINE EFFECT - A THEORETICAL NOTE

Abstract

Keywords

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