Abstract
When axiomatizing a body of truths, one first concentrates on obtaining a set of axioms that entail all and only those truths. The theorist expects that this complete system will have some needlessly strong axioms that can later be weakened or even deleted. What happens if the theorist includes in his system recognition of this superfluity? Contradiction! Even admitting the possibility of superfluity dashes all hope of consistency. Any suspicion of superfluous information must be voiced from outside the system.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 572-588 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Australasian Journal of Philosophy |
| Volume | 97 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Early online date | 31 Oct 2018 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 3 Jul 2019 |
Keywords
- Blaise Pascal
- Relevance
- Self-reference
- Superfluous information
- Theoretician’s dilemma