Testimonial reliance

Sanford C. Goldberg

doi:10.1007/s10670-022-00647-2

Testimonial reliance

Sanford C. Goldberg^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Forming a belief on the basis of accepting another’s testimony often involves a kind of reliance on the (say-so of the) testifier. I argue that this reliance has epistemically relevant features that cannot be represented in most mainstream theories in the epistemology of testimony. The targeted views are those that embrace individualism about testimonial justification.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	2683-2702
Number of pages	20
Journal	Erkenntnis
Volume	89
Issue number	7
Early online date	20 Dec 2022
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00647-2
Publication status	Published - Oct 2024

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AB - Forming a belief on the basis of accepting another’s testimony often involves a kind of reliance on the (say-so of the) testifier. I argue that this reliance has epistemically relevant features that cannot be represented in most mainstream theories in the epistemology of testimony. The targeted views are those that embrace individualism about testimonial justification.

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Testimonial reliance

Abstract

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