Temporal Necessity and Logical Fatalism

Joseph Diekemper

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)


I begin by briefly mentioning two different logical fatalistic argument types: one from temporal necessity, and one from antecedent truth value. It is commonly thought that the latter of these involves a simple modal fallacy and is easily refuted, and that the former poses the real threat to an open future. I question the conventional wisdom regarding these argument types, and present an analysis of temporal necessity that suggests the anti-fatalist might be better off shifting her argumentative strategy. Specifically, two points of interest emerge from my analysis: first, temporal necessity turns out to be an inappropriate and ineffective tool for the fatalist to make use of; and, second, the dismissal of the argument from antecedent truth value turns out to be an over-hasty one.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)289-296
JournalProceedings of the Aristotelian Society
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2004


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