SUPER-MAJORITES, ONE-DIMENSIONAL POLICIES, AND SOCIAL SURPLUS

Daniel Cardona*, Clara Ponsati

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    2 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    In the setting of a one-dimensional legislative bargaining game, we characterize qualified majority rules maximizing social surplus, that is, the sum of individual benefits. The simple majority rule maximizes social surplus when individual utilities are tent-shaped. When the utilities are strictly concave, the surplus maximizing rule is a strict supermajority.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)884-898
    Number of pages15
    JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
    Volume16
    Issue number6
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Dec 2014

    Keywords

    • BARGAINING MODEL

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