Strong implementation with partially honest individuals

Foivos Savva

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    5 Citations (Scopus)


    In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for a social choice rule to be implementable in strong Nash equilibrium in the presence of partially honest agents, that is, agents who break ties in favourof a truthful message when they face indifference between outcomes. In this way, we achieve a relaxation in the condition of Korpela (2013), namely the Axiom of Sufficient Reason. Our new condition, Weak Pareto Dominance, is shown to be sufficient along with Weak Pareto Optimality and Universally Worst Alternative. We finally provide applications of our result in pure matching and bargaining environments.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)27-34
    JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
    Early online date17 Jul 2018
    Publication statusPublished - Oct 2018


    • Strong implementation
    • Partial honesty
    • Tie-breaking rule


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