Strong implementation with partially honest individuals

Foivos Savva

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.002

Strong implementation with partially honest individuals

Foivos Savva

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for a social choice rule to be implementable in strong Nash equilibrium in the presence of partially honest agents, that is, agents who break ties in favourof a truthful message when they face indifference between outcomes. In this way, we achieve a relaxation in the condition of Korpela (2013), namely the Axiom of Sufficient Reason. Our new condition, Weak Pareto Dominance, is shown to be sufficient along with Weak Pareto Optimality and Universally Worst Alternative. We finally provide applications of our result in pure matching and bargaining environments.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	27-34
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	78
Early online date	17 Jul 2018
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.002
Publication status	Published - Oct 2018

Keywords

Strong implementation
Partial honesty
Tie-breaking rule

Access to Document

10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.002Licence: CC BY

Savva_2018_JME_Honest_CC
Copyright © 2018 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Final published version, 339 KBLicence: CC BY

Cite this

@article{6699c3ffad1a4484bd387af9119cb86e,

title = "Strong implementation with partially honest individuals",

abstract = "In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for a social choice rule to be implementable in strong Nash equilibrium in the presence of partially honest agents, that is, agents who break ties in favourof a truthful message when they face indifference between outcomes. In this way, we achieve a relaxation in the condition of Korpela (2013), namely the Axiom of Sufficient Reason. Our new condition, Weak Pareto Dominance, is shown to be sufficient along with Weak Pareto Optimality and Universally Worst Alternative. We finally provide applications of our result in pure matching and bargaining environments.",

keywords = "Strong implementation, Partial honesty, Tie-breaking rule",

author = "Foivos Savva",

note = "This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [ES/J500136/1].",

year = "2018",

month = oct,

doi = "10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.002",

language = "English",

volume = "78",

pages = "27--34",

journal = "Journal of Mathematical Economics",

issn = "0304-4068",

publisher = "Elsevier",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Strong implementation with partially honest individuals

AU - Savva, Foivos

N1 - This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [ES/J500136/1].

PY - 2018/10

Y1 - 2018/10

N2 - In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for a social choice rule to be implementable in strong Nash equilibrium in the presence of partially honest agents, that is, agents who break ties in favourof a truthful message when they face indifference between outcomes. In this way, we achieve a relaxation in the condition of Korpela (2013), namely the Axiom of Sufficient Reason. Our new condition, Weak Pareto Dominance, is shown to be sufficient along with Weak Pareto Optimality and Universally Worst Alternative. We finally provide applications of our result in pure matching and bargaining environments.

AB - In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for a social choice rule to be implementable in strong Nash equilibrium in the presence of partially honest agents, that is, agents who break ties in favourof a truthful message when they face indifference between outcomes. In this way, we achieve a relaxation in the condition of Korpela (2013), namely the Axiom of Sufficient Reason. Our new condition, Weak Pareto Dominance, is shown to be sufficient along with Weak Pareto Optimality and Universally Worst Alternative. We finally provide applications of our result in pure matching and bargaining environments.

KW - Strong implementation

KW - Partial honesty

KW - Tie-breaking rule

U2 - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.002

DO - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.002

M3 - Article

SN - 0304-4068

VL - 78

SP - 27

EP - 34

JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics

JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics

ER -

Strong implementation with partially honest individuals

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this