Strategic wage bargaining with destructive power: The role of commitment

P Manzini

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    5 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We build a simple alternating-offers bargaining model in which one of the players can commit to damage the ''pie'' that they are bargaining over. In the unique equilibrium partition his share does not vary monotonically with the discount factor.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)15-22
    Number of pages8
    JournalEconomics Letters
    Volume54
    Issue number1
    Publication statusPublished - Jan 1997

    Keywords

    • bargaining
    • commitment
    • PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM
    • MODEL

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