Strategic bargaining with destructive power

P Manzini

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    9 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This note studies a two-player alternating offers bargaining model in which one of the agents has the ability to damage permanently the 'pie' bargained over. Beside the 'Rubinsteinian' bilateral monopoly outcome, I show that it is possible to select a 'harming' equilibrium in which the sequence of damages to the pie is endogenously determined. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)315-322
    Number of pages8
    JournalEconomics Letters
    Volume65
    Issue number3
    Publication statusPublished - Dec 1999

    Keywords

    • bargaining
    • commitment
    • WAGE

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