Stable multilateral trade agreements

[No Value] Macho-Stadler, D Perez-Castrillo, C Ponsati

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    3 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We analyse multilateral tariff negotiations as a game in coalition form. In a model with three identical countries that produce and trade an homogeneous commodity, and where countries' aggregated welfare can weight differently their different components, we analyse how changes in the countries' objective affects the stability of coalitions. In other words, we characterize what tariff-agreements, if any, are stable (i.e. lie in the core).

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)161-177
    Number of pages17
    JournalEconomica
    Volume65
    Issue number258
    Publication statusPublished - May 1998

    Keywords

    • CUSTOMS UNIONS
    • CORE

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