Simple hyperintensional belief revision

F. Berto

doi:10.1007/s10670-018-9971-1

Simple hyperintensional belief revision

F. Berto^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

27 Citations (Scopus)

11 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. (Revised) belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to non-classical logics, or to non-normal or impossible worlds semantics. The framework combines, instead, a standard semantics for propositional S5 with a simple mereology of contents.

Original language	English
Number of pages	17
Journal	Erkenntnis
Volume	First Online
Early online date	5 Feb 2018
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-9971-1
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 5 Feb 2018

Keywords

Belief revision
Doxastic logic
Epistemic logic
Framing effects
Hyperintensionality
Inconsistent belief management
Non-monotonicreasoning

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10.1007/s10670-018-9971-1Licence: CC BY

Berto_2018_Erkenntnis_Simple_CC
© The Author(s) 2018. Open Access. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Final published version, 328 KBLicence: CC BY

Cite this

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AB - I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. (Revised) belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to non-classical logics, or to non-normal or impossible worlds semantics. The framework combines, instead, a standard semantics for propositional S5 with a simple mereology of contents.

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KW - Epistemic logic

KW - Framing effects

KW - Hyperintensionality

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JO - Erkenntnis

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Simple hyperintensional belief revision

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Keywords

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