Serious actualism, typography, and incompossible sentences

Christopher James Masterman*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Serious actualists take it that all properties are existence entailing. I present a simple puzzle about sentence tokens which seems to show that serious actualism is false. I then consider the most promising response to the puzzle. This is the idea that the serious actualist should take ordinary property-talk to contain an implicit existential presupposition. I argue that this approach does not work: it fails to generalise appropriately to all sentence types and tokens. In particular, it fails to capture the right distinctions we ought to make between what I call typographical sentence types—an interesting and previously undiscussed class of fine-grained sentence types which are partially individuated by their typography, or how they look when written out.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages18
VolumeFirst Online
Early online date18 Apr 2023
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 18 Apr 2023


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