Rule-following without reasons: Wittgenstein's quietism and the constitutive question

Crispin Wright

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49 Citations (Scopus)


This is a short, and therefore necessarily very incomplete discussion of one of the great questions of modern philosophy. I return to a station at which an interpretative train of thought of mine came to a halt in a paper written almost 20 years ago, about Wittgenstein and Chomsky,(1) hoping to advance a little bit further down the track. The rule-following passages in the Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics in fact raise a number of distinct (though connected) issues about rules, meaning, objectivity, and reasons, whose conflation is encouraged by the standard caption, 'the Rule-following Considerations'.(2) Let me begin by explaining my focus here.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)481-502
Number of pages22
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2007


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